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Abstract
Traditional auction mechanisms support price negotiations on a single item. The
Internet allows for the exchange of much more complex offers in real-time. This is
one of the reasons for much research on multidimensional auction mechanisms
allowing negotiations on multiple items, multiple units, or multiple attributes of an
item, as they can be regularly found in procurement. Combinatorial auctions, for
example, enable suppliers to submit bids on bundles of items. A number of
laboratory experiments has shown high allocative efficiency in markets with
economies of scope. For suppliers it is easier to express cost savings due to
bundling (e. g., decreased transportation or production costs). This can lead to
significant savings in total cost of the procurement manager. Procurement
negotiations exhibit a number of particularities:
– It is often necessary to consider qualitative attributes or volume discounts in
bundle bids. These complex bid types have not been sufficiently analyzed.
– The winner determination problem requires the consideration of a number of
additional business constraints, such as limits on the spend on a particular supplier
or the number of suppliers.
– Iterative combinatorial auctions have a number of advantages in practical
applications, but they also lead to new problems in the determination of ask prices.
In this paper, we will discuss fundamental problems in the design of combinatorial
auctions and the particularities of procurement applications.
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